No Final Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity’s Triumph in Federal Public Law by Rowe, Thomas D., Jr.
NO FINAL VICTORIES: THE
INCOMPLETENESS OF EQUITY'S
TRIUMPH IN FEDERAL PUBLIC LAW
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.*
I
INTRODUCTION
If Professor Laycock senses a "segregationist spirit" in some attitudes about
keeping equity distinct and intact,1 I hear a note of triumphalism about the
scope and approaches of equity in the articles for this symposium. At the con-
ference where these papers were first given, I began my comment on the essays
of Justice Gummow,2 Professor Laycock,3 and Chancellor Quillen4 with the re-
mark that my role might be that of skunk at Professor DeMott's garden party.
Yet to put it that way would exaggerate my point, for I wish to sound a note of
partial qualification rather than discord.
Part II discusses prominent areas where the United States Supreme Court has
denied equitable relief, demonstrating the limited nature of equity's "triumph"
in federal public law. Part III expands the focus of Part II to decisions outside
the realm of equity that nonetheless evidence the Court's hostility toward the
spirit of equity in the area of federal public law. Finally, Part IV considers the
rationales behind the trend away from equity in these federal public law
decisions.
II
THE LIMITS OF EQUITY'S TRIUMPH IN FEDERAL PUBLIC LAW
Gummow, Laycock, and Quillen describe an impressive triumph of the
jurisdiction, procedure, attitudes, and remedies of equity in a range of states and
nations and across broad substantive areas. This comment does not differ with
what they say, but calls attention to and explores briefly a significant, if partial,
exception to this triumph. An outpost that has so far less than fully fallen to the
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triumph of equity is modern U.S. federal public law as addressed in several
recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Here, the jurisdiction of federal courts
is often construed narrowly and exercised with restraints. Clear rules are often
favored over discretion. The irreparable injury rule has not only escaped death
but found some invigoration. Reasons of state can justify less-than-full remedia-
tion. Even the flexible procedural devices that spread from equity into all of
today's merged civil practice can encounter obstacles to their full use.
It may initially seem odd to suggest that a leading, if partial, holdout from
the triumph of equity is public law, because one of the most cited articles in
modern legal literature is Professor Abram Chayes' description and celebration
of an expansive judicial role in federal public law litigation.5 To some extent,
though, Chayes may have helped flush a target, for many opinions of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have rejected, or at least cautioned against, key elements
of Chayes' vision.6 Chayes spoke broadly of the new public law litigation model
as involving "a grievance about the operation of public policy" and relief that is
"forward looking," "flexible and broadly remedial," rather than being "conceived
as compensation for past wrong in a form logically derived from the substantive
liability and confined in its impact to the immediate parties.",
7
Contrast Chayes with Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Allen v.
Wright,8 which denied standing to black parents challenging the alleged laxity
of IRS enforcement against tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private
schools.9 She counseled "against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to
enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to
seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to
fulfill its legal duties."1 Such suits "are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-
court adjudication."'1 O'Connor offered a second rationale for the Court's conclusion:
5. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
The Chayes article ranked eleventh in a survey of modem law review articles most cited in law reviews.
See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1550 (1985). By count
of citations in Shepard's Law Review Citations since 1979, the Chayes article stood third. See id. at 1554.
Chayes is alpha and omega, so to speak, for two of the articles commented upon here: Professor
Laycock cites Chayes in his opening footnote, see Laycock, supra note 1, at 53 n.*, and Justice Gummow
quotes him for his conclusion, see Gummow, supra note 2, at 104 & n.104. For an assessment of the
impact of the Chayes article suggesting that it focused on institutional reform suits already on the wane
but helped catalyze thinking about procedural reform, see Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and
Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647 (1988).
6. Chayes himself described and criticized aspects of this limiting trend six years after the Public
Law Litigation article. See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
7. Chayes, supra note 5, at 1302.
8. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
9. The plaintiffs did not challenge any particular school's exemption, nor did they allege their chil-
dren's exclusion from any exempted private school. See id. at 743-46. Rather, they claimed "a direct
injury from the mere fact of the challenged Government conduct and ... injury to their children's
opportunity to receive a desegregated education." Id. at 746. The Court took them to be alleging that
their rights were "violated by IRS grants of tax-exempt status to some number of unidentified racially
discriminatory schools in desegregating districts . I..." d. at 745 n.11.
10. Id. at 761.
11. Id. at 760.
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Even if the relief respondents request might have a substantial effect on the
desegregation of public schools, [it weighs against finding standing that] whatever
deficiencies exist in the opportunities for desegregated education for respond-
ents' children might not be traceable to IRS violations of law-grants of tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools in respondents' communities. 2
Allen v. Wright has special force because, as an Article III standing
opinion," it constitutionalizes some hurdles facing efforts at federal court adju-
dication after the Chayes model. That decision and the other developments
discussed here do not, of course, shut down all such adjudication; just ask some
litigants before district judges such as William Wayne Justice.14 Still, Allen v.
Wright erects a threshold barrier that can at least deflect some public law plain-
tiffs toward suits cast more nearly in the traditional mold that Chayes argued was
being transformed.15
12. Id. at 753 n.19.
13. See id. at 755-56 (on "constitutional limits on the role of the federal courts" precluding standing
to press claims based on "abstract stigmatic injury"); id. at 756-61 (on constitutional problem with finding
standing for Allen v. Wright plaintiffs to litigate the non-abstract injuries that they did allege because
those injuries were not "fairly traceable" to the government action).
14. See, e.g., Young v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (Justice, C.J.) (ordering federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development to implement affirmative action tenant-assignment
program in numerous low-rent housing projects, and vesting in special master power to investigate
Department's activities and monitor its compliance); Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(Justice, C.J.) (enforcing previously entered state prison reform orders with civil contempt findings and
order). Judge Justice, of the Eastern District of Texas, had been assigned to preside in the consolidated
statewide Ruiz prison conditions litigation after it was transferred to the Southern District. See Ruiz v.
Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1275-76 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir.), opinion amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982). See generally William
Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992) (distinguishing
"jurisprudential activism," overrulling precedents or finding legislation unconstitutional based on values
determined by judges, from "remedial activism" of expansive remedies for demonstrated constitutional
violations, and defending his use of the latter variety).
15. See Chayes, supra note 5, at 1282-83 (listing features of traditional conception of civil
adjudication: bipolar lawsuit; retrospective; interdependent right and remedy; lawsuit as self-contained
episode; and process party-initiated and party-controlled).
Writing in 1982, Chayes questioned the effect of the Court's decisions narrowing standing: "[Tihe
great standing expansion of the 1960's remains relatively untouched; in the vast majority of public law
cases, it has been possible to turn up a plaintiff who has suffered the requisite injury in fact." Chayes,
supra note 6, at 23 (footnote omitted). That may have been and may remain true to a considerable
extent, but Chayes wrote before the two major standing limitation decisions of the 1980s, Allen v. Wright
and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying constitutional standing to seek injunctive
relief to victim of police chokehold on ground that likelihood of repetition as to him posed insufficient
threat to establish required injury). After a period of relative quiescence in the late 1980s, the Court
has again taken a narrow view of constitutional standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992) (environmental and animal fights organizations lack standing to challenge Secretary of
Interior's narrowing of regulation concerning other federal agencies' obligation to consult with him under
Endangered Species Act about projects within foreign countries, even though some of organizations'
members alleged that they had visited, and planned to visit again, foreign sites that could be affected by
regulation change).
Allen v. Wright and Defenders of Wildlife could be especially significant in undermining Chayes'
1982 argument because they dealt in part not with the injury requirement upon which he focused but
on the causation aspect of constitutional standing requisites. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 753 & n.19,
756-61; Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-42 (plurality opinion). Defenders of Wildlife also
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Even when such plaintiffs surmount standing hurdles, an equitable remedy
may not be easy to get. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 6 the Supreme Court
majority took the extraordinary step of discussing and rejecting the availability
of federal equitable relief against allegedly unconstitutional police chokeholds
after it had ruled against federal jurisdiction on constitutional standing
grounds. 7 Even with no state adjudications pending, the Court said that not
only equity but principles of comity and federalism "should inform the judgment
of federal courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities. In
exercising their equitable powers federal courts must recognize '[t]he special deli-
cacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and
State administration of its own law.' '18 Instead of a federal suit with a possible
injunctive remedy, chokehold victim Lyons could sue for damages, rely on
possible criminal prosecution of Los Angeles police officers, or hope that the
state courts' standing and remedial requirements were not so demanding."
The most striking limit on federal equitable relief, and the sharpest contrast
with the developments discussed in the papers commented on, is the heightening
of the irreparable injury requirement in the Younger v. Harris' line of cases.
The Younger doctrine governs the availability of federal injunctive and declarato-
ry relief against many pending state criminal and civil proceedings, and some
state administrative adjudications.
In his last Term, Justice Hugo Black wrote for the Court in the Younger
opinion that even if the federal Anti-Injunction Statute2' poses no bar,22 a
federal court is not to enjoin a pending state prosecution on a showing of ordi-
nary irreparable harm, but must find irreparable injury "'both great and imme-
diate."'" Such showings will be rare, requiring "bad faith, harassment, or
imposed constitutional limits on Congress' power to confer upon private parties standing to enforce
Executive obligations to observe procedures required by law. See id. at 2142-46 (majority opinion).
16. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
17. See id. at 101-10 (discussing reasons for finding no Article III case or controversy in plaintiff's
count seeking injunctive relief against police chokehold policy, before turning to availability of injunctive
remedy "if it be assumed that [plaintiff's] pending damages suit affords him Art. III standing to seek an
injunction ...." id. at 111).
18. Id. at 112 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)).
19. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113.
20. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.").
22. Cf Younger, 401 U.S. at 54 ("Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary
under equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider whether [the
Anti-Injunction Statute] would in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case."). The
Court subsequently held in Mitchum v. Foster that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the umbrella statute generally
authorizing actions for alleged state deprivations of federal rights, qualifies as an "expressly authorized"
exception to § 2283. 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972). Section 1983 claimants seeking federal court
anticipatory relief against pending state proceedings, however, must still satisfy Younger's requirements.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 11.2.2, at 561 (1989) ("Section 1983 constitutes
an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but not to the Younger doctrine.").
23. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
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[some] other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief."'24 By
contrast, as Justice Gummow points out, in Australia's (less prominent) public
law litigation, the High Court seems to have declined to require an extraordinary
showing--of a need to prevent "grave injustice"-as a prerequisite to an interim
injunction.' And Professor Laycock's prodigious research supports the
conclusion that equitable remedies have generally become "ordinary, not ex-
traordinary. 2 6  Yet as he has previously argued, certain applications of the
Younger limit--especially to persons who want to engage in a continuing course
of conduct and are prosecuted for past acts-may mean that no adequate relief
is available.27 Such a result is contrary to the insistence on full adequacy that
pervades all the fields surveyed in this symposium by Gummow, Laycock, and
Quillen.
One should not come away with the impression that federal equitable relief
has lost most of its bite, even in public law cases. The areas just discussed are
especially prominent and sensitive; they should not obscure what Laycock
describes as the "routine" use of injunctions in such significant public law areas
as environmental, civil rights, and constitutional litigation.2  Even in cases
posing the most acute of federal-state tensions, the picture is mixed. As recently
as 1990, a bare majority of the Supreme Court upheld federal judicial power to
order a local government to levy taxes to fulfill an obligation imposed by federal
law, no matter if such taxes would exceed the authority granted the locality by
state law.29 Since-retired Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, however, were
needed for the majority, and such expansive views of federal courts' remedial
authority might get as warm a welcome from the current Court as has the
Chayes model.3°
24. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. On the rarity with which relief can issue when Younger's
extraordinary-showing requirements apply, see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 13.4.
25. See Gummow, supra note 2, at 88 (discussing Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia,
[19861 161 C.L.R. 148 (Austl.)). The Ontario standard apparently rejected in Castlemaine Tooheys
placed a heavy burden indeed on those challenging the constitutional validity of laws and seeking interim
injunctive relief, a burden stated in terms strikingly similar to those used in Younger: "[I]n exceptional
circumstances this court [may grant] an interim injunction to prevent grave injustice, but that will be rare
indeed." Morgentaler v. Ackroyd, [1983] 42 O.R.2d 659, 668 (High Ct.).
26. Laycock, supra note 1, at 54.
27. See generally Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospective Relief, 1977 SuP. Cr. REV. 193.
28. Laycock, supra note 1, at 57.
29. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55-58 (1990).
30. Indeed, earlier in the same Term in which the Court decided Jenkins, a switch of one vote (that
of Justice White) had made a 5-4 majority the other way in a similar case. The Court struck down, as
an abuse of equitable discretion, the imposition of contempt sanctions against city council members for
failing to adopt an ordinance the city had agreed to enact pursuant to a federal court remedial order in
a housing discrimination case, and which the court had ordered enacted after delays by the city in
implementing the agreement. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). For commentary
discussing both Jenkins and Spallone, see The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV.
L. REv. 129, 296-308 (1990).
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III
BEYOND EQUITY: THE COURT AND THE SPIRIT OF EQUITY IN OTHER
AREAS
The fields just discussed perhaps best illustrate the recent tendency of the
Supreme Court to limit the availability and use of broad federal equitable
authority. Three other examples of developments in decisions outside the realm
of equity offer further contrasts with the spirit documented in the Gummow,
Laycock, and Quillen articles. These are: first, the limits on implied private
rights of action for federal constitutional violations by federal officials under
cases after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics;31 second, occasional manifestations of highly positivist or narrow approaches
to construction of the Constitution, statutes, treaties, and rules; and third,
procedural rulings that raise questions about how fully equity has conquered
common law, specifically cases on heightened pleading requirements and de-
cisions affecting the use of joinder devices derived from, but no longer limited
to, equity.
Equity may "delight[] to do justice and not by halves,"32 and it may "not
suffer[] a wrong to be without a remedy.,33 Following the same spirit in cases
dealing with damages, the Court had shown itself willing to allow damage claims
for constitutional deprivations by federal officials when Congress had afforded
no remedy. 4  However, in the last several years the Court has refused to
extend that willingness to situations in which Congress has afforded an
incomplete remedy. It is now clear that if Congress provides even a limited
remedy for a constitutional deprivation by federal officials, whether or not it
focused on cases involving harm beyond the remedy limits, and whether or not
it explicitly said that a claimant can get no more than the statutory remedy
provides, the statutory provision will ordinarily set the limit even when it gives
less-than-full remediation.35 The Supreme Court's deference to Congress when
31. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
32. Laycock, supra note 1, at 65; see also Quillen, supra note 4, at 50.
33. Quillen, supra note 4, at 50.
34. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (allowing Fifth Amendment damage claim for gender
discrimination against member of Congress); Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing Fourth Amendment
damage claim against federal narcotics agents).
35. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1988) ("The absence of statutory relief for a
constitutional violation . . . does not imply ... that courts should award money damages against the
officers responsible for the violation."). On the facts of Chilicky, the majority "agree[d] that suffering
months of delay in receiving the [Social Security disability benefit] income on which one has depended
for the very necessities of life cannot be fully remedied by the 'belated restoration of back benefits,"'
id. at 428, and conceded that "[t]he trauma to respondents, and thousands of others like them, must
surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal sensibilities would wish to see imposed on innocent
disabled citizens," id. at 428-29. Still, it rejected "the notion that statutory violations caused by
unconstitutional conduct necessarily require remedies in addition to the remedies provided generally for
such statutory violations," id. at 427, and stated that "the presence of alleged unconstitutional conduct
that is not separately remedied under the statutory scheme [does not] imply that the statute has provided
'no remedy' for the constitutional wrong at issue," id. at 427-28 (emphasis in original).
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a statutory remedy provides less-than-full relief for a constitutional violation
contrasts with the rule in Delaware that the Delaware General Assembly cannot
constitutionally curtail the general equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
without providing an adequate remedy at law.3'
Underlying decisions like those that limit Bivens remedies against federal
government officials may be a certain statism on the part of some Justices.37
At times it seems that while claimants against government wrongs like those in
Schweiker v. Chilicky38 get only what the law specifically allows, 39 the govern-
ment may get against an individual everything that the law does not expressly
forbid.' Whatever the tilt, in some modem Supreme Court opinions there
appears a highly positivist attitude"1 that is far removed from Delaware's equi-
A subsequent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit illustrates the confining force of
Chilicky. Two panels had issued conflicting opinions on parallel Bivens claims before Chilicky, and the
court granted rehearing en banc in both cases. After Chilicky, the often fiercely divided circuit was able
to issue a unanimous opinion ruling against the Bivens claims. The D.C. Circuit viewed "the Chilicky
Court [as having] made clear that it is the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme involved, not the
,adequacy' of specific remedies extended thereunder, that counsels judicial abstention." Spagnola v.
Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam). Under Chilicky, "courts must
withhold their power to fashion damages remedies when Congress has put in place a comprehensive
system to administer public rights, has 'not inadvertently' omitted damages remedies for certain claim-
ants, and has not plainly expressed an intention that the courts preserve Bivens remedies." Id. at 228.
36. See Quillen, supra note 4, at 38-40. Further, even if the General Assembly provides a "full,
adequate, and complete remedy at law," concurrent equitable jurisdiction survives "unless the General
Assembly expressly states or necessarily implies that the legal remedy is exclusive." Id. at 37.
37. See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv. 80, 140
(1991) (Rehnquist Court's failure to use intermediate approaches, or to protect asserted rights allegedly
because to do so "would be anti-majoritarian," "reflects either woeful ignorance or a willful 'statist'
desire to negate the alleged rights regardless of their true majoritarian support").
38. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. Chilicky, involving a possible claim against an individual government official, raised no problems
of sovereign immunity. When states' Eleventh Amendment immunity against individual damage suits
in federal court has been at issue, the Court has recently stiffened-if that be possible-the already
extraordinary showings required to find congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. "Lest [a
previous decision] be thought to contain ambiguity, we reaffirm today that ... evidence of Congressional
intent must be both unequivocal and textual." Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989). "In
particular," the Dellmuth Court rejected the relevance of legislative history to such findings, requiring
that Congress' intention be "'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' Id. (quoting
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
40. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (rejecting claim that extradition
treaty with Mexico should be construed to prohibit suspect's extrajudicial abduction, for which U.S.
authorities were responsible, from Mexican territory for trial in United States, even though Mexico
protested and abduction violated international law); cf. William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of
Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1138 & n.36 (1992) (noting
contrast between positions in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (allowing federal common law defense to state tort claim for federal military
contractors), and his concurrence in the judgment in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988)
(suggesting abandonment of judicial recognition of implied private statutory rights of action)).
41. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.)
("where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures
which are to be employed in determining that right, a [procedural due process claimant] must take the
bitter with the sweet"). The Court has since rejected the "bitter with the sweet" approach of the Arnett
plurality, see, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); but a similar attitude
resurfaces and at times prevails in cases like Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188.
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table concept that "inequitable action does not become permissible simply be-
cause it is legally possible."4 2
A kindred rigor of construction appears in some areas of procedure affecting
federal public law actions. Professor Laycock, drawing on the work of Professor
Stephen Subrin,43 counts among the triumphs of equity over common law "the
rejection of technical pleading rules in favor of simple, straightforward pleading,
the extreme development of which was captured in the phrase 'notice plead-
ing."'" Yet in the important standing case of Warth v. Seldin," Justice
Powell's Court opinion referred repeatedly to the need for plaintiffs to "allege
facts" to show aspects of standing,' and parsed the complaint to point out fine
omissions of the sort ordinarily dealt with in modern practice well after the
pleading stage.47 With what seems like ample justification, Justice Brennan's
dissent chastised the majority opinion for its "overtones of outmoded notions of
pleading"' and for "reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured in the
federal courts.,
49
A final set of examples of the restrictive tendencies described comes from
Supreme Court decisions affecting the use of party joinder devices, whose
modem breadth Laycock presents as another aspect of equity procedure's tri-
umph."o Since at least the early 1970s, the Court has ruled several times against
ancillary jurisdiction involving some of the more aggressive, yet generally per-
missible, forms of party joinder. The decisions effecting these restrictions cut
across public and private law litigation alike, although they often happen to have
evolved in cases with public law overtones.
The clearest recent instance of this approach is Justice Scalia's opinion for the
five-Justice majority in Finley v. United States.51  Although joining as
co-defendants alleged tortfeasors who may be jointly, severally, or alternatively
42. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971), quoted in Quillen, supra note
4, at 49. Schnell is alive and well in Delaware. After quoting the statement reproduced in text and
describing it as the "crux of Schnell," the Supreme Court of Delaware recently observed: "Schnell's
broad holding spawned an entirely new line of Court of Chancery decisions." Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d
75, 91 (Del. 1992) (citations omitted).
43. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
44. Laycock, supra note 1, at 65.
45. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
46. See, e.g., id. at 504, 516.
47. See id. at 504-18 passim. In the recent case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992), Justice Scalia's majority opinion, although holding against standing, may signal a turn back
toward less rigorous pleading attitudes. His opinion says that at "the pleading stage, general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice .... " Id. at 2137. He goes on
to contrast the greater specificity required in response to a summary judgment motion, or in the support
necessary at trial if relevant facts remain controverted. See id.
48. Warth, 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 528.
50. See Laycock, supra note 1, at 65 ("Equity took the ... position.., that all interested parties
should be joined so that complete justice could be done in every case ... Our modern.., joinder rules
obviously build on the equity model[.]").
51. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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liable is permissible party joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a),52
Finley forbade "pendent party" jurisdiction over a Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA") plaintiffs state law claim against a nondiverse private defendant. The
impact was especially unfortunate as federal jurisdiction over FTCA claims
against the United States is exclusive;53 an FTCA plaintiff thus had to file sepa-
rate federal and state court actions, or to forgo either the claim against the
United States or that against a private defendant who could not be sued in
federal court. The Scalia opinion made its premise, and its attitude toward statu-
tory construction at least in this sub-area, clear: "[W]ith respect to the addition
of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume that the
full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read
jurisdictional statutes broadly."'  The opinion issued a virtual invitation to Con-
gress to legislate if it did not like the result.5 The consequences of the Finley
ruling were severe enough that Congress acted promptly, overruling Finley and
largely taking the leading role in the area that is now called "supplemental juris-
diction" away from the federal courts.
5 6
Finley drew on a line of cases including Zahn v. International Paper Co."
In Zahn, the Court completely ignored ancillary jurisdiction arguments made at
length by the dissent,58 and ruled against federal jurisdiction over unnamed
plaintiff class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) diversity class action59 if their
separate claims did not independently satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement, even though the named representatives' claims were large enough.
For cases part of which can or must be in federal court, the effect of Zahn is
somewhat like that of Finley. The Zahn rule refuses to let related claims not
within original federal jurisdiction tag along. Plaintiffs must either proceed in
both state and federal court, forgo one or another set of claims, or-if none of
the claims is within exclusive federal jurisdiction-abandon the federal forum
afforded by Congress and seek a single adjudication in state court.
Zahn, in turn, is one in a series of leading cases in which the Court clipped
the wings of the federal class action, a child of equity. Some of the other
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a):
.... All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
54. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549.
55. See id. at 556 ("Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular
statute can of course be changed by Congress.").
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. III 1991).
57. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
58. See id. at 303-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) permits class action treatment if Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are met and if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
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important restrictive decisions, though, seem more defensible than Zahn.'
Further, by no means have all the Court's class action rulings been restrictive. 1
Still, the cases do show that the triumph of equity62 has been only partial, with
some especially significant limits, in areas that involve or at least bear on federal
public law.
IV
RATIONALES FOR THE NARROWING TREND IN PUBLIC LAW DECISIONS
If it is worthwhile in itself to point out the differences between equity's
general triumph in many other respects and the limits on its conquest in modem
federal public law, it is also important to consider the sources and significance
of the contrast. Three main themes appear on the surface of the decisions: first,
concern for interbranch separation of powers and limits on the role of the federal
judiciary; second, deference to state interests in the name of federalism; and
third, the influence of formalist "plain meaning" approaches to statutory
construction. Separation of powers, federalism, and plain meaning construction
are large topics on which much has been and could be written; this short
comment is not the place for extended further discussion. This section tries only
to address the roots of these concerns, to illustrate some reliance on these
themes in the cases, and to offer observations on the applications discussed
above.
At the moment, strong emphasis on separation of powers, federalism, and
plain meaning tends to be associated with conservative judicial and political
thinking.' The ascendancy of these attitudes can be no surprise since nearly
60. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (relying on Rule 23(c)(2)'s requirement
for (b)(3) class actions of "individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort" to forbid random selection of sample of very large class to receive notice); Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332 (1969) (forbidding aggregation of separate and distinct claims to satisfy amount in controversy
requirement when no named or unnamed class member's individual claim allegedly did so). For criticism
of Snyder, Zahn, Eisen, and other restrictive Supreme Court class action decisions, see Chayes, supra
note 6, at 28-39.
61. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981) (striking down order restricting
communications by counsel for the plaintiff class's representatives to prospective class members); United
States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (under class action exception to mootness doc-
trine, appellate correction of erroneous denial of class certification relates back to date of original
denial); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991) (reaffirming Geraghty and applying
class action exception to case in which class representatives' claims had become moot before trial court
could rule on class certification).
62. The term "equity" is used loosely here to include matters not unique to but characteristic of
equity, such as emphasis on full remediation and broad joinder. By relying on the term for convenience,
I mean to convey no disagreement with Professor Laycock's substantive position that (jury trial issues
aside) arguments and decisions about the content of legal rules should turn on functional considerations
and not the historic law-equity distinction. See Laycock, supra note 1, at 56, 73-78.
63. The qualifier "at the moment" is used because purported allegiances to somewhat abstract
concerns, such as federalism, tend to shift on the political spectrum with changes over time in substantive
issues and control over different loci of power in United States government. On the historical
contingency of such leanings, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1141, 1146-47 n.17 (1988) (noting liberals' emphasis on states' rights themes during Lochner era
of progressive state legislatures and conservative federal courts, and earlier in opposition to pro-
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all Supreme Court nominations for the past quarter century have partly been ani-
mated by reaction against the perceived excesses of, paradigmatically, the War-
ren Court.' Sometimes it is at least plausible to suspect covert substantive
leanings at work behind the superficially neutral rhetoric of the current Court's
opinions.65 Yet I see insufficient reason to doubt that the often fully overt
views on separation of powers, federalism, and plain meaning interpretation are
anything but genuine and influential, if not always controlling or treated with full
consistency.'
Allen v. Wright, discussed above,67 exemplifies reliance on separation of
powers in one of the cases showing the incomplete triumph of equity in federal
public law. The Court there asserted (with a questionable, unqualified sweep)
that "the law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of sep-
aration of powers."' Although Justice O'Connor's effort at supplying an ani-
mating concern to help lower courts in construing and applying standing require-
ments seems oversimplified at best, it does reflect the majority's apparent sense
that resort to the courts, rather than the political process, should generally be
denied to ideological plaintiffs with dubious direct injury or attenuated links to
the challenged government conduct. In addition, even though the separation of
powers emphasis in standing was not so crystallized at the time of Warth v.
Seldin, the hostile parsing of the pleadings there69 may be understandable if
seen as reflecting judicial caution at starting down the path toward possible con-
stitutional invalidations of political decisions without a clear showing of a
slaveholder Supreme Court decisions).
64. For a thoughtful critique of a broad judicial role in the making and enforcement of public
policy, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
65. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 635, 659 (1985) ("One could perhaps be forgiven for confusing standing's agenda with that of
the New Right."); see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
66. For a critique of the consistency of conservative judges' reasoning in standing and Eleventh
Amendment cases, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333
(1992) (arguing that separation of powers and federalist reasoning used to support narrow standing and
broad Eleventh Amendment decisions shows same "penumbral" approaches that conservatives criticize
in such decisions as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and that such departures from textual-
ism are more justified to protect individual rights than in other areas).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
68. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968):
The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not,
by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial inter-
ference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. . . . Thus, in
terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is
related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated is presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.
If standing rests exclusively on separation of powers, as the Court seems to say in Allen v. Wright, it is
hard to see why a standing problem should ever exist in challenges to action by state or local, rather than
federal, governments. Moreover, reliance on separation of powers to say that a matter is for the political
branches to resolve risks turning traditionally party-focused standing into a subject matter-based denial
of judicial competence, historically the office of the political question doctrine. See Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (urging that the Court "straightforwardly
[consider] the justiciability of the issues [raised], rather than using those issues to obfuscate standing
analysis").
69. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
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concrete dispute. The result, though, has been a technical and notably manipu-
lable doctrine that dubiously favors challenges by the targets of regulation over
those by intended beneficiaries.7' The Court's approach also diverts what ought
to be a direct, if not always simple, determination of who should be entitled to
seek enforcement of an asserted legal duty toward metaphysical inquiries into
"injury in fact," "traceability," and "redressability."7
The strongest other illustration of the role of separation of powers emphases
in drawing the Court away from a position consistent with the triumph of equity
comes from recent decisions in the Bivens line of cases. These holdings treat
damage remedies but implicate the (not uniquely, to be sure) equitable emphasis
on full remediation. In the now leading case of Schweiker v. Chilicky,7 2 which
denied further Bivens remedies for federal officials' constitutional violations
when Congress has provided partial relief without expressing itself either for or
against a supplemental Bivens remedy, the majority's explanation sounds strongly
in deference to relative legislative competence and responsibility: "When the de-
sign of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may
occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens
remedies.""
The Bivens issue arises, of course, because Congress has not said whether it
considers the statutory remedial mechanisms adequate. The presumption with
which the courts approach that determination, when serious wrongs can remain
unrelieved if congressionally provided remedies are exclusive, thus becomes vital.
For the dissenters, when Congress had "never mentioned, let alone debated, the
desirability of providing a statutory remedy" beyond back benefits for harms suf-
fered by disability claimants affected by constitutionally wrongful cutoffs, it was
"inconceivable that Congress meant by mere silence to bar all redress for such
injuries."'74
The majority's response joins issue on the question of approach, sounding
again the separation of powers theme of the relative roles of the different
branches: "Whether or not we believe that its response was the best response,
Congress is the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required
in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program."75 Why this
legislative responsibility justifies a presumption against-rather than for-full re-
mediation, when Congress could adapt to either approach, is defended in
concrete terms only by a reference to recruitment difficulties stemming from the
"prospect of personal liability for official acts."76 That justification is, however,
70. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432,
1459-60 (1988).
71. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
72. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
73. Id. at 423.
74. hI. at 431-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. 1I at 429 (opinion of the Court).
76. Id. at 425.
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a form of double counting because approval of Bivens actions would still leave
officials with the full panoply of immunity defenses, which rest partly on the
same concern for the effect of officials' personal liability on recruitment of
officials."
Turning from separation of powers to federalism emphases, the Younger v.
Harris line of cases is often referred to by the label "Our Federalism," an infe-
licitous phrase used by Justice Black.7" The equitable relief discussion in City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons79 also brought the federalism theme amply to the sur-
face. The stress on considering intrusions upon state autonomy in deciding on
the availability of federal equitable relief reflects a degree of states'-rightism seen
in some other areas, such as Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.' And as
with individual officials' immunities when they are successfully invoked in civil
rights damage actions, Younger's federalism-based constraints on federal equity
can deny full relief for what is or may be a deprivation of a federal right.
The question becomes how strong the justifications are for such denials.
With individual officials' immunities8 ' the functional concerns for official
performance and recruitment, and the fairness of liability if officials must pay for
deprivations they could not reasonably have been expected to know were
unlawful, are apparent and support at least the core of immunity doctrine' if
not some of its extensions.' Federalism is a more abstract justification, and it
is hard to identify concrete harms if federal courts with congressionally
authorized jurisdiction grant otherwise unavailable full injunctive relief against
irreparable harm from deprivations of federal rights."
The third theme, a degree of strict-constructionist formalism, may help
account for some of the other limits noted on the triumph of the spirit of equity.
Professor Laycock sensitively notes both the prevailing acceptance of judicial
discretion along with the poor light in which "formalism" is viewed, 5 and the
77. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.1, at 403.
78. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
79. 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 18.
80. See supra note 39. The Court has recently extended its Eleventh Amendment "plain statement"
approach into the construction of federal statutes that might raise Tenth Amendment issues. See
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (1991) ("We will not read the [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act] to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included. ....
[Ilt must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges.") (emphasis in original); id. at 2399-
2403 (discussing federalism and Tenth Amendment concerns, "plain statement" rule of Eleventh
Amendment cases, and its utility in avoiding possible constitutional problems).
81. These immunities, although available to state and local officials, are not federalist in their
grounding, as parallel immunities govern in actions against federal officials. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-504 (1978).
82. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.1, at 403.
83. See id. § 8.6.3, at 416-19.
84. See generally Laycock, supra note 27, at 231:
Rigid insistence that only great and immediate injury to the federal plaintiff offsets the
state's interests ignores the extent to which the inadequacy of the state remedy directly
eliminates some of the state's interests from the balance. The desire to avoid negative
reflection on the state courts simply drops out of the equation when the federal intervention
is to grant relief unavailable there.
85. Laycock, supra note 1, at 75.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
virtues of and defenses for some degrees and applications of formalism.'
Wherever that debate had stood in recent times, the Supreme Court today is
often pushing this ever-oscillating pendulum' toward a greater degree of for-
malism.
A prime expression of this spirit comes in Justice Scalia's lecture, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules.8 He cites some common advantages of "establishing
as soon as possible a clear, general principle of decision,"' 9 including predict-
ability' and avoidance of judicial arbitrariness.91 He also points to the limits
on the Supreme Court's ability to superintend areas of the law. 2  Scalia
acknowledges the inevitability of more discretionary modes of decision: "We will
have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis with us
forever-and for my sins, I will probably write some of the opinions that use
them."93 Yet it is little if any exaggeration to say that he strives to minimize
the scope for judicial discretion.' He does so not only for the reasons just
mentioned but also because his views on the separation of powers lead him to
seek to avoid judicial lawmaking.9
Although Justice Scalia does qualify his position and is only one voice on the
Court, his influence shows in such opinions as Finley.' His position seems in
harmony with the positivist strains' that can run counter to the spirit of equi-
ty-and, for that matter, to the policy-based and flexible tradition of adjudication
in the substantive common law.98 It is also consistent with recent decisions such
as the formalistic (albeit defensible) invalidation of the legislative veto in I.N.S.
v. Chadha,9 decided before Justice Scalia joined the Court. Moreover, Scalia's
preference for clear rules fits with the Court's increasing reliance in statutory
construction on "plain meaning"1" and its sometime aversion to looking
86. See id. at 77.
87. See generally, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
88. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
89. Id. at 1179.
90. See id
91. See id. at 1182.
92. See id. at 1178.
93. Id. at 1187.
94. See Popkin, supra note 40, at 1164-70.
95. See id. at 1167-69.
96. "What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background
of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts." Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
97. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 40, at 1133-35.
99. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
100. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 531 (1991) ("that Congress may not have
foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give
effect to its plain meaning"). See generally Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179 (1986); Patricia M. Wald,
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beyond the text at legislative history.10 1 These, too, are subjects for large
debates;"° but it is puzzling why it is argued so strongly'0 3 that problems with
reliance on statutes' legislative history should go to admissibility rather than to
weight."° And a strong case has been made that Justice Scalia's approaches
to constitutional and statutory interpretation, despite the rhetorical emphasis on
a limited judicial role, have the effect of shifting power away from Congress to
the Court in constitutional matters and to the executive for the interpretation of
statutes. 0 5 It seems not out of place to wonder if it is entirely coincidental that
the legislative is the only branch of the federal government mostly in liberal
hands in recent decades.16
No set of attitudes among reasonably sophisticated judges, to be sure, comes
unmixed. Those inclined to give considerable weight to states' policies and
interests find occasion to uphold strong assertions of federal power. 7 Those
who often call for judicial deference to other branches of the federal government
reject nonfrivolous arguments against judicial authority."° And, of course, the
tendencies cited as possible explanations for the phenomena described above do
not always point in the same direction. Justice O'Connor, who began a 1991
habeas corpus opinion with the statement that "[t]his is a case about federal-
ism," °9 has since written two opinions in effect protesting that in the name of
The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990).
101. See supra note 39. Strong majorities of the current Court have, however, repeatedly rejected
Justice Scalia's near-total rejection of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. See
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 n.12 (1993); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct.
2476, 2484 n.4 (1991).
102. For a somewhat sympathetic exploration of the "plain meaning" approach, see Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. Cr. REV.
231.
103. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567, 1572 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) ("The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.... But not the least of the
defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy .... We should not pretend to care about legislative
intent (as opposed to the meaning of the law ....")).
104. But see Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV.
L. REv. 1005 (1992).
105. See Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160.
106. See id. at 192 n.152 ("It will be interesting to see whether Justice Scalia modifies his stance in
favor of executive power when future executives no longer share his substantive political views.").
107. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991) (opinion joined by all eight participating Justices,
holding that state officials sued in their individual capacities for official acts are "persons" subject to
damage suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with Eleventh Amendment no bar to such suits in federal court);
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (unanimous opinion holding that state law sovereign immunity
defenses are unavailable against § 1983 claims in cases in state court).
108. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 1424-30 (1992)
(unanimously rejecting Department of Justice argument that Congress' choice among alternative House
of Representatives apportionment methods was nonjusticiable political question, but upholding selection
on merits as within congressional power); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2306 (1991) (finding, without disagreement from opinion
dissenting on merits, that citizens living along airport flight paths have standing to bring separation of
powers challenge to congressional review board over local airport authority).
109. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991).
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federalism the Court was taking, or at least threatening to take, too many
liberties with the text of the statute governing federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners."n
Still, the unstable equilibrium resulting from such tensions yields significant
deviations from the triumph of equity in substance and spirit that the three prin-
cipal articles document in Australia, Delaware, and the United States at large.
These deviations to some extent cluster in, without being confined to, the po-
litically sensitive field of federal public law. The justifications that appear to
underlie these deviations are weighty and traditionally accorded considerable
respect in our jurisprudence. Yet in some of the decisions-such as those
making standing doctrine a technical obstacle course to claims by intended
beneficiaries of regulation and those refusing, in the name of separation of pow-
ers and federalism, to provide full relief for violations of federal rights-the
applications seem to reach beyond what the rationales fairly support. They bring
to mind the description of an ideologue as one who cares little for the harm done
in the name of one's theory.
V
CONCLUSION
An earlier conservative Justice, who took separation of powers and
federalism seriously, showed that they need not become abstractions overriding
the real harm of denying full equitable or legal relief. In Bivens, facing the issue
of the implication of a legal damages remedy, the second Justice Harlan in his
powerful concurrence addressed whether judicial action in a legislative mode was
justified in the context before the Court. Exceptionally for him, he concluded
that it was.111 He further considered the adequacy of other remedies and
stressed that "[flor people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." '
Similarly, in a little noticed case in 1960, Justice Harlan wrote for a majority
in upholding the availability of equitable restitution for wages lost when an
employer violated federal law by firing employees who had complained of
violations of federal wage and hour statutes. "When Congress entrusts to an
110. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482,2498 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In light of the case
law and Congress' position [considering but refusing to enact language establishing a deferential
standard], a move away from de novo review of mixed questions of law and fact would be a substantial
change in our construction of the authority conferred by the habeas corpus statute."); Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("the balance of state and federal interests
regarding whether a federal court will consider a claim raised on habeas cannot be simply lifted and
transposed to the different question whether, once the court will consider the claim, it should hold an
evidentiary hearing. Moreover, I do not think the Court's decision can be reconciled with 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d).") (emphasis in original).
111. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (in resolving "whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or
'appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted ... it seems to me that the range of policy
considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would
consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy").
112. Id. at 410.
[Vol. 56: No. 3
Page 105: Summer 1993] EQUITY AND FEDERAL PUBLIC LAW
equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory
enactment," he wrote, "it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic
power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes."
' n3
He supported his argument with quotations from early and more recent Supreme
Court opinions: In an 1837 decision the Court had said that "there is inherent
in the courts of equity a jurisdiction to ... give effect to the policy of the
legislature."' 14 And a 1946 case under wartime price control regulation had
proceeded from the premise that "the comprehensiveness of [federal] equitable
jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid
legislative command.""' 5 The principal articles show the continuing strengths
of the equitable tradition. Justice Harlan's history and example show that its
greater flourishing in federal public law would be neither innovation nor judicial
usurpation.
113. Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960).
114. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 203 (1839), quoted in Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
115. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946), quoted in Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
For more extensive discussion of Justice Harlan's position in Mitchell, Bivens, and kindred cases, see
Donald H. Zeigler, Justice Harlan and Implied Rights of Action, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 205, 208-13
(1991).
For an example of the continuing debates over the judicial role in assuring full remediation on the
modern Court, see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). Franklin dealt
with the availability of damages for sexual harassment and abuse in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). The Court had previously held in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), that private parties could enforce Title IX through
an implied right of action, but it had not dealt specifically with whether money damages were an
available remedy. Upholding the damages remedy when the general right of action has already been
recognized, Justice White's majority opinion stated as the "general rule" that "absent clear direction to
the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a
cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. Justice
Scalia's limited concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, questioned the
majority's general rule in the context of implied rights of action: "To require, with respect to a right that
is not consciously and intentionally created, that any limitation of remedies must be express, is to
provide, in effect, that the most questionable of private rights will also be the most expansively
remediable." Id. at 1038 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

